I, like other philosophers, have a habit of understatement in which “it seems plainly false” means “it is plainly false.”
… a mad crackpot genius named Wittgenstein who believed that everything was words. Really. If your car would not start, it was apparently to be
understood as a language problem. If you were unable to love, you were lost in language.
Any everyday story in daily performance is
oriented by language in execution, by talking and speaking, just as
no love story is thinkable without at least three words: you, I, we.
What you do is first said to you the other day. And what
you say becomes an event as it escapes from you.
But if you say: “How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?”
then I say: “How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?”
“I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again
and again, ‘I know that that’s a tree’, pointing to a tree that
is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell
him: ‘This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing
Todey the most common use of the term ‘naturalism’ might be described as follows: philosophers (…) announcing in one or another conspicuous place in their esseys and books that thay are ‘naturalists’ (…) ; this announcement, in its placing and emphasis, resembles the placing of the announcement in articles written in Salin’s Soviet Union that a view was in agreement with Comrae Stalin’s (…) ; any view that is not ‘naturalist is anathema and colud not possibly be correct.